product of an undervaluing of religious freedom, but only of an institutionally-based concern with vesting too much unaccountable power in judges.' Some of the same judges who were in the majority in Smith, notably Antonin Scalia, have been quite receptive to legislatively crafted religious accommodations, and they have even been willing to construct judicially crafted exemptions pursuant to statutory authorization. Hobby Lobby is an example: the Court fashioned a new exemption for for-profit businesses that had religious objections to providing insurance for "emergency contraception," even though that exemption had not been requested by any of the parties. 6 Until Hobby Lobby, it appeared that a new regime was coming into existence in which courts would accommodate religious liberty when that could reasonably be done without impairing legitimate state purposes. The Court has now abruptly lurched into an entirely different regime, one Congress never intended, in which religion will almost always be accommodated, even if the consequence is serious injury to non-adherents, so long as there is some imaginable less restrictive means for protecting those adherents -and regardless of whether that means is likely to materialize or not.
The Court is evidently keen to protect religious liberty, but this reading of the law is a disaster for religious liberty. Religious liberty, according to the Court's reasoning, could sometimes mean the right to impose severe burdens on those who do not share one's religious views. If this is now to be the authoritative meaning of that liberty, then the longstanding, broad consensus that has historically supported it will inevitably collapse.
I. RFRA BEFORE HOBBY LOBBY
Federal and state legislatures responded to Smith by attempting to reverse it by statute. Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which provides that "Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability," unless the Government "demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."' RFRA was invalidated by the Supreme Court as applied to state and local government (on states' rights grounds),' but continues to apply to federal action.' Similar protections against state law are given by the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and by many state constitutions and state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts. 10 for most of those who object to obeying particular laws. 14 The argument for giving these judgments to the judiciary is that courts hear cases one at a time and so are confronted, as legislatures are not, with concrete situations. Courts are also committed to treat like cases alike. Legislatures often overlook the impact of rules on minority religious groups.
If those groups are able to go to court, even with the support of a rule as vague as the so-called "compelling interest" test, they will sometimes prevail." Sometimes, but not always. Whatever its formal expression, the scrutiny given to religiously burdensome government actions prior to Smith was deferential. 16 Beginning with the birth of the free exercise exemption regime in 1963 and running to its general demise in 1990,17 the Court considered at least fourteen exemption claims under the Free Exercise Clause, but granted only five (four of which involved denial of unemployment compensation benefits).1" At the time when the Court first 14. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430-31 (2006) (holding that Government must show not only that it has a compelling interest in applying a law to the particular religious claimant, and not merely that its interest is compelling in the abstract).
15. Before Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), held that there is no right to religious exemptions from laws of general applicability, free exercise claims had a success rate of 39.5%. Afterward, that success rate dropped to 28.4%. More importantly, the number of filed claims plunged after Smith, from 310 decided in the nine-and-a-quarter years before the decision to thirty-eight in the three-and-a-half years after it. Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, which temporarily (until the Supreme Court struck it down in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)) restored the "compelling interest" test as applied to state laws, success rates rose to 45.2% and the number of filed claims in that three-year period rose to 114, perhaps in response to the strong legislative signal that courts should take religious impact very seriously. used the term, "strict scrutiny" referred merely to cost/benefit balancing, not an automatic presumption of invalidity.
19 One study has reported that between 1980 and 1990 the federal appellate courts rejected an astounding 87% of free exercise exemption claims. 20 Even under RFRA and its successor statute, the Religious Land Use and Incarcerated Persons Act, the federal courts ruled against the claimants over 70% of the time prior to Hobby Lobby.
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Even given this limited role for the courts, there are legitimate reasons to worry about the judiciary engaging in this kind of prudential balancing as a matter of constitutional right. Any answer the courts arrive at will depend on a prediction about the effects of accommodation -for example, whether it is safe to let Sikh boys carry ceremonial daggers in school, or whether children are harmed by allowing them to miss two years of high school for religious reasons. If the prediction turns out to be wrong, it will be hard for a court to say that the meaning of the Constitution has changed.
The regime that RFRA aimed to restore was one in which courts are instructed by legislatures to balance on a case-by-case basis, but the results that courts reach can be revisited and overridden by legislatures -and so it answers the concern about unaccountable judicial power that played such a prominent role in Smith. Eugene Volokh has observed that this result plays to the strengths of both courts and legislatures. Courts get to decide, in the first instance, what to do in concrete instances of hardship, but the ultimate officer exemption from uniform requirement that would preclude him from wearing yarmulke); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (denying religious organization exemption from minimum wage and reporting provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (denying Amish employer exemption from requirement that he pay social security taxes on employees); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (denying claimant who religiously objected to "unjust" war rather than all wars exemption from draft), with Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (granting unemployment compensation benefits to appellant who refused to work on Sundays at a temporary retail position due to his sincerely held religious beliefs even though he was not a member of a recognized religion); Hobbie v. Unemp't Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (granting unemployment compensation benefits to appellant who refused to work on her Sabbath); Thomas v. Review Bd. of id. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (granting unemployment compensation benefits to appellant who terminated his job because his religious beliefs forbade him from participating in the production of war materials); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (granting persons resigning or dismissed from employment for religiously motivated refusals to work on certain days or at certain duties held exempt from "availability for work" condition for receipt of unemployment benefits); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (granting Amish parents exemption from state law requiring school attendance to age sixteen).
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Stephen outweighed by a vague, generalized interest in "the promotion of public health." 3 1 One court was clueless enough to conceptualize the problem as one of determining the harm to the government if the exemption is granted. 32 In those now superseded decisions, the upshot was that women who worked for those employers -a lot of women; Hobby Lobby has over 20,000 full time employees -got no coverage.
Women take account of costs when deciding whether to use contraceptives. 33 Had Hobby Lobby been granted the exemption it sought, thousands of women would have incurred significant out-of-pocket costs or forgone altogether the contraceptives Hobby Lobby refused to cover if they could not afford to pay for them. 34 For women who need a particular contraception option at a particular time, this loss of coverage is a discrete, focused, and significant harm, especially in emergencies entailing the risk of pregnancy from coerced sex.
In addition, there are numerous health-related and economic repercussions associated with the failure to make available the full range of contraception. For example, pregnancy may be dangerous for women with serious medical conditions, such as pulmonary hypertension, cyanotic heart disease, and Marfan Syndrome.
3 5 The lives of women suffering from these conditions literally depends on their access to the contraception most effective for them. Similarly, "there are demonstrated preventive health benefits from contraceptives relating to conditions other than pregnancy [,] " which include the prevention of certain cancers, menstrual disorders, and acne.
36 Again, proper treatment of women suffering from these conditions depends their access to particular forms of contraception.
The use of contraceptives also reduces the risk of unintended pregnancies, which comprise nearly half of all pregnancies in the United States.
37 Women with unintended pregnancies are less likely to receive timely prenatal care, and are more likely to smoke, consume alcohol, become depressed, experience domestic violence during pregnancy, and terminate their pregnancies by abortion. 3 8 Finally, unintended pregnancies prevent women from participating in labor and employment markets on an equal basis with men.
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The Court deflected one of Hobby Lobby's principal claims by assuming, without deciding, that the government's interest was compelling. Doubtless some members of the five-judge majority disagreed with that, but Anthony Kennedy's separate concurrence signaled pretty clearly that he thought so, and Ruth Ginsburg's dissent, for four justices, was even clearer. That's a majority of the Justices. So what could have been a disaster for women's equality suddenly became a victory.
Having assumed a compelling interest, the Court moved on to leastrestrictive burden. It noted that the Obama Administration had crafted a clever solution for religious nonprofits. Those companies' insurers were required to provide contraception in separate policies, for free -something the insurers were happy to do, because even expensive contraception for all covered women is cheaper than childbirth for a few. The Court's decision essentially required that the same accommodation be extended to religious for-profit employers. The Administration is working on new regulations in order to provide the coverage.
The women will probably get their contraceptive coverage -though as we explain below, that is not as certain as the Court evidently thought.
But note the role of contingency and luck in this outcome. Suppose that the accommodation in question were not one that could be promulgated by regulation, or that there had been an administration in power less concerned about delivering contraceptive services to women. Then the consequence of accommodating Hobby Lobby would have been that these women would not receive their contraception coverage for the indefinite future. Hobby Lobby to cut off access to contraceptives to its female employees indefinitely.
The key passage of the Court's decision declared that the "most straightforward way" of providing coverage "would be for the Government to assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives at issue to any women who are unable to obtain them under their health-insurance policies due to their employers' religious objections."
The Court rejected the claim that "RFRA cannot be used to require creation of entirely new programs." 4 2 Although "[w]e do not doubt that cost may be an important factor in the least-restrictive-means analysis," it observed that "the cost of providing the forms of contraceptives at issue in these cases (if not all FDAapproved contraceptives) would be minor when compared with the overall cost of ACA," which is "more than $1.3 trillion through the next decade." 4 3
The less restrictive alternative that the Court proposes here -but did not have to reach, because of the accident that there was another program already in existence that it could rely on -is one that could not possibly be enacted, now or perhaps ever.
Justice Kennedy left considerable doubt whether he was prepared to follow the Court's least restrictive means dictum. He was skeptical about "imposition of a whole new program or burden on the Government." 44 In Hobby Lobby, he declared, there happened to be "an existing, recognized, workable, and already-implemented framework" 45 for accommodating the religious objection. This fact "might well suffice to distinguish the instant cases from many others in which it is more difficult and expensive to accommodate a governmental program to countless religious claims based on an alleged statutory right of free exercise."
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On the other hand, he joined the majority opinion in full, and he did not make clear in his concurrence whether the "difficulty" that he would consider in deciding whether a less-restrictive alternative is "available" would include political 
III. THE POLITICS OF CONTRACEPTION
The Hobby Lobby majority suggested in dicta that RFRA requires the government to pursue direct distribution or funding of disputed contraceptives as a less restrictive alternative to imposition of the Mandate on objecting employers. 47 In the majority's view, the Mandate failed strict scrutiny under RFRA even though it was assumed to further compelling government interests in promoting women's health and reducing gender disparities in healthcare costs, because direct government supply of the contraceptives would afford the same access to contraceptives as the Mandate without infringing on Hobby Lobby's religious anti-contraception beliefs. 48 The majority found it unnecessary to hold that government distribution was required, however, because of the existence of the religious nonprofit "accommodation." This accommodation excuses from the Mandate those religious nonprofit employers not already categorically exempted as churches or religious congregations, such as religiously affiliated hospitals, universities, and social service organizations. 49 The accommodation requires the employer to complete and sign a government form that lists the religiously objectionable contraceptives that its health plan will not cover, and then to send the form to its third-party health insurer or, if self-insured, to its plan administrator."o The employer's health plan is then relieved of the obligation to cover the contraceptives to which it objects, which are instead supplied by the insurer or plan administrator at no additional cost to employees, dependents, or the objecting employer."
Rather than finding that the government was required to supply objectionable contraceptives directly, therefore, the Court held that it could 47 . Id. at 2800 02. 48. Id. 51. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c) (2013). In accordance with the Court's suggestion, the government recently initiated a rulemaking procedure designed to extend the religious nonprofit exemption to closely held for-profit corporations that object to the Mandate. See, Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 51118 (proposed Aug. 27, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). Self-insured employers fund their own insurance plans, but rarely pay claims or otherwise administer the plans themselves, contracting instead with the third-party insurance company to act as the "plan administrator" for the employer.
extend the religious nonprofit accommodation to closely held for-profit employers who religiously object to the Mandate, as a less restrictive alternative to imposing the Mandate on such employers.
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A critical premise of the majority opinion, therefore, is that all female employees and dependents of Hobby Lobby would in fact receive the mandated contraception coverage if the government were to pursue either direct government funding of contraceptives to which employers object, or extension of the religious nonprofit accommodation to closely held forprofit businesses. 53 In either event, the majority flatly declared, "[t]he effect of the HHS-created accommodation on the women employed by Hobby Lobby . . . would be precisely zero," since "these women would still be entitled to all FDA-approved contraceptives without cost-sharing.
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As so often happens when the Court describes aspects of the world with which it is not familiar, this proposition is true only in theory, and probably false in fact.
The Accommodation Is Not Costless
Supplying contraceptives is thought to be cost-neutral to third-party insurers who sell health plans paid for with employer premiums, because the costs such insurers incur in providing free contraceptives are almost certainly equal to or less than the prenatal and childbirth expenses they avoid by facilitating the increased use of contraception." This is not the case, however, for plan administrators who operate health plans for selfinsured employers; in that case the benefit of childbirth expenses avoided by contraceptives accrues to the employer who funds the plan rather than the administrator who runs it. Administrators will thus incur additional 52. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2803 06. 53. The Court reasoned that extension of the religious nonprofit accommodation to closely held for-profit businesses does not impinge on the plaintiff's religious belief that providing insurance coverage violates their religion, and it serves HHS's stated interests equally well. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782-83 ("The principal dissent identifies no reason why this accommodation would fail to protect the asserted needs of women as effectively as the contraception mandate, and there is none. Under the accommodation, the plaintiffs' female employees would continue to receive contraceptive coverage without cost sharing for all FDA-approved contraceptives, and they would continue to 'face minimal logistical and administrative obstacles,' because their employers' insurers would be responsible for providing information and coverage.")(quoting id. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)); accord, Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2807 (2014) ("Nothing in this interim order affects the ability of the applicant's employees and students to obtain, without cost, the full range of FDA approved contraceptives.").
54. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760.
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Studies have consistently shown that an insurer's cost of covering contraceptives in a health insurance plan is equal to or less than the cost of the prenatal care and childbirths that effective use of contraception avoids. operating costs from providing contraceptives in the place of objecting employers, costs that will not be offset by the realization of savings elsewhere.
6
Accordingly, the Mandate originally allowed administrators of selfinsured plans funded by objecting religious nonprofit employers to claim a credit against the tax paid by administrators and other insurers on individual policies sold on the healthcare.gov and the various state exchanges, equal to the additional costs they will incur from providing no-cost contraception to the employees and dependents of such employers.
5 7 in other words, the contraceptives supplied under the accommodation by plan administrators of self-insured plans are paid for by the government through a "taxexpenditure"-lower revenues from the tax credit that would otherwise have gone to fund aspects of the ACA or other government operations. 
Extending the Accommodation to For-Profits Is Likely to Require More Funding
The use of tax expenditures to fund the accommodation was not originally thought to raise significant problems, because it was not expected to require significant government funding. Religious nonprofit employers and employees constitute a very small part of the national economy, so the number of claimants was expected to be correspondingly small. Thus, extending the religious nonprofit accommodation to closely held for-profit businesses, as the Court suggested and the administration proposed in the wake of Hobby Lobby, 63 will expand the universe of potential religious claimants and affected employees from a very small to a quite large percentage of all employers and employees.
In light of this dramatic expansion of potential RFRA claimants and negatively affected employees, it can no longer be assumed that the required funding will be minimal or otherwise insignificant-to the contrary, it is likely to require additional funds. Self-insured businesses tend to be large operations with tens of thousands of employees and covered dependents-Hobby Lobby funds a self-insured plan, for example, which covers more than 20,000 employees, plus their covered dependents; the cost to Hobby Lobby's plan administrator of supplying free contraception to its female employees and covered female dependents will be significant, especially if, as might be expected, they choose IUDs. 4 No one knows how many of these businesses would exercise the option created by the Supreme Court. The number might be very small. It might be very large.
Figures showing the proportion of religious nonprofits to all nonprofit businesses
In short, expansion of the religious nonprofit accommodation to closely held corporations might not be feasible without a substantial increase in government spending. Assertions by RFRA supporters that extending the accommodation to closely held for-profit business corporations will "cost the government nothing to implement" are simply wrong. 65 
Congress Is Unlikely to Approve Contraception Funding
Funding for either a substantially larger exchange-tax credit or direct government funding for contraception is not politically viable, and it is disingenuous to suggest otherwise. Religious and political conservatives have been trying to defund federal contraception-coverage programs since the Reagan administration, 6 6 with considerable success: Title X funding, for example, has been cut nearly in half in real terms since inception of the program in 1974.67 Many of the same persons and groups are also actively committed to defunding the entire ACA, 68 and filed amicus briefs in support of Hobby Lobby's argument that for-profit businesses are entitled to a RFRA exemption from the Mandate under RFRA. 69 These persons and groups are unlikely to increase funding for Title X, to replace funds lost by significantly increased claims of the exchange tax credit, or to fund any other government program designed to supply free contraceptives to female employees and dependents of for-profit employers exempted from the Mandate. Unsurprisingly, the aftermath of Hobby Lobby has seen no letup in conservative efforts to defund Title X and the ACA, and to block or reduce direct government supply of contraceptives. 70 No conservative person or organization has stepped up to endorse an increase in Title X or other government funding of contraception to fill the potentially large contraception coverage gap created by opening the religious nonprofit accommodation to closely held secular for-profits, and religious conservatives continue to attack the nonprofit accommodation itself of contraceptives its limited funding permits is similarly limited as it serves only lower-income women-and, as we have indicated, Hobby Lobby's social conservative allies have been trying to eliminate it altogether.
2 If the healthcare plans of Hobby Lobby and other closely held for-profit businesses were exempted from the Mandate on the theory that their employees and covered dependents could obtain disputed contraceptives from family planning organizations receiving Title X grants, it is doubtful that such organizations could pick up the slack without a significant and politically improbable increase in Title X funding and expansion of eligibility requirements.
If direct government contraception coverage or extension of the existing religious nonprofit accommodation requires additional funding that is unlikely to be approved, then it cannot reasonably be maintained that either of these alternatives is truly "available."
7 3 The political realities blocking government funding of contraception serve as stark reminders that whatever lawyers or judges might conjure up as hypothetical alternatives, in the real world where women actually live an increase in Title X or accommodation funding or the creation of any other such program to fill the gap caused by RFRA exemptions is politically dead on arrival in Congress. RFRA exemptions for religiously objecting employers therefore threaten to force female employees and the covered female dependents of all employees to pay out of pocket for something that the government has compelling interests in making available through employer health plans at no additional cost. The "alternative" to the Mandate proposed by the Hobby Lobby majority exists only in the imaginations of the Justices who suggested it, 7 4 and risks leaving the government unable to advance its admittedly compelling goals of protecting women's health and reducing gender disparities in healthcare costs whenever government funding is required.
IV. THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS POSSIBLE
Smith and Hobby Lobby together show that the Court is far more 
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Cf Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2802 n.26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that "in context of First Amendment Speech Clause challenge to a content-based speech restriction, courts must determine 'whether the challenged regulation is the least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives"') (quoting Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004)) (emphasis in original).
74. See Lupu, supra note #, at 89 ("It is unlikely in the extreme that Congress will pay for the various contraceptives to which Hobby Lobby and other firms object on religious grounds, so this alternative may somehow be theoretically adequate but politically impossible.").
aggressive in accommodating religion as a matter of statutory interpretation than it has been as a constitutional matter. The theoretical possibility of legislative overruling -and of a legislatively crafted less restrictive alternative -evidently becomes a license for aggressive judicial policymaking.
Another innovation of Hobby Lobby was the Court's embrace of a less restrictive alternative that was not proposed by the party seeking the exemption. Hobby Lobby didn't care at all about women's access to emergency contraception, and was untroubled that the RFRA exemption it sought would wholly deny them this coverage.
7 5 The Court devised its solution on its own. The upshot is that now, when government resists a religious exemption claim, it will not be enough for it to show that the alternatives proposed by the claimant are not feasible. It will need to rebut every imaginable alternative.
7 6 As the Court insisted, "If a less restrictive means is available for the Government to achieve its goals, the Government must use it." 7 7
Justice Joseph Story, defending the Supreme Court's holding that Congress has a broad choice of means for carrying out its enumerated powers, 7 8 observed that if a specific exercise of power had to be absolutely necessary, then some powers could not be exercised at all. One could always imagine an alternative to whatever the government elects to do. 
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Story wrote: It will be found, that the operations of the government, upon any of its powers, will rarely admit of a rigid demonstration of the necessity (in this strict sense) of the particular means. In most cases, various systems or means may be resorted to, to attain the same end; and yet, with respect to each, it may be argued, that it is not constitutional, because it is not indispensable; and the end may be obtained by other means. The consequence of such reasoning would be, that, as no means could be shown to be constitutional, none could be adopted. For instance, congress possess the power to make war, and to raise armies, and incidentally to erect fortifications, and purchase cannon and ammunition, and other munitions of war. But war may be carried on without fortifications, cannon, and ammunition. No particular kind of arms can be shown to be absolutely necessary; because various sorts of arms of different convenience, power, and utility are, or may be resorted to by different nations. What then becomes of the power?
Similarly, when government burdens religion, it will often be possible to imagine a less restrictive means for accomplishing what government wants, particularly if that means involves spending money. Even a religious group that routinely steals money from nonadherents will at least be able to argue that government could compensate its victims, and if the group is small and only steals small sums, it can also argue that the cost of doing so will not be exorbitant. More realistically, this analysis suggests that in United States v. Lee, the Court should have found that it was a less restrictive alternative for the government to pay the social security taxes of the objecting Amish employer-the cost of doing so for the small number of employees involved was miniscule compare to the vast amount collected and disbursed annually by the Social Security Administration.
Because the alternative that is the basis for religious accommodation need not be politically feasible, the consequence of this new interpretation of the statute will be that in practice, RFRA exemptions will sometimes impose severe costs upon identifiable and discrete third parties. We have argued elsewhere that a law that does this violates the Establishment Clause.so
It is also pertinent that the people who will be harmed by this interpretation of RFRA are politically powerless minorities. When an accommodation is deemed not to be the least restrictive means, and some group is consequently harmed, they will ask the legislature for relief. The legislature will act or it won't. The class of RFRA victims will be those who do not have enough political power to persuade the legislature to expend whatever resources are necessary to enact the alternative hypothesized by the court. Some of those people, like the women in Hobby Lobby, will be people whose needs are urgent enough to qualify as compelling government interests. The Court assumed that those interests are compelling, but left to the contingencies of politics the question whether those needs would in fact be met. Had those women found an administration in power that was less solicitous of their needs -say, one that, like Hobby Lobby and its social conservative allies, regarded those needs as illegitimate -then they would have been out of luck. The consequence is not merely that abstract compelling interests will be neglected. It is that the needs of real people needs will be neglected. RFRA, as construed by the Court, is an injury-generating machine that will produce a class of persons who are harmed, perhaps severely harmed, in order to accommodate the religious Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, § 1240. This is a different effect than is usually associated with the less restrictive means test. That test will sometimes prevent the government from doing what it is trying to do, but the costs are usually spread across all of society or a very large group;" they are rarely concentrated on a few people in the way that the costs of a religious employer exemption can be concentrated on its nonadherent employees. When the compelling interest test is applied to suspect classifications, or to laws that infringe on fundamental rights, the interest being pursued is often an interest shared by the majority of citizens. Minorities get the same benefits -for example, the guarantee that health insurance policies will cover basic needs such as contraception -as the majority that wants them for itself. Justice Scalia has declared that what keeps government action within "reasonable and humane limits" is "the Equal Protection Clause, which requires the democratic majority to accept for themselves and their loved ones what they impose on you and me." 8 2 John Hart Ely put the same thought this way: equal protection works by "tying the interests of those without political power to the interests of those with it," forbidding representatives from "sever[ing] a majority coalition's interests from those of various minorities."83 RFRA, as construed by the Court, accomplishes that severing. Had the Obama Administration not acted, the affected women were too small a group to secure political relief. And that would have been that.
Frederick Mark Gedicks and
The suspect-classification doctrine exists in order to bar government from pursuing illegitimate purposes, such as the oppression of racial minorities.
8 4 Thwarting those purposes has no social cost that is worth 81. Religious and other nonprofit tax exemptions work in this manner; while they marginally increase the tax liability of individuals and for-profit businesses, the increase is spread across taxpayers in the entire jurisdiction, and thus is relatively small. The Court has repeatedly explained: the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen "fit" this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.
City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989 counting." Infringements of fundamental rights are generally suffered by unpopular minorities as well: opinions that most people revile are the ones most likely to be censored. In both these areas, the deployment of the doctrine will sometimes thwart the government completely from doing what it wants to do, but the cost of blocking the government is unlikely to be concentrated on powerless minorities. Maybe the state won't be able to devise another way to pursue whatever goal it was pursuing, but this inaction is unlikely to be attributable to the powerlessness of some minority. Hobby Lobby introduces a deployment of the least restrictive means test that predictably leaves minorities vulnerable in precisely this way.
The argument we have just set forth invites the objection that the Court lacks the institutional means to predict the likelihood of political resistance to any particular suggested less restrictive means.
8 6 One response is that the Justices do not hesitate to make such predictions when it suits their purposes. In its first review of the ACA, for example, the Court held that the ACA's threat to deprive states of existing Medicaid funding if they did not participate in the proposed Medicaid expansion exceeded Congress's spending power.
8 7 Justice Ginsburg argued that this elevated form over substance, because this condition was functionally equivalent to Congress's repealing the existing Medicaid program, and then reenacting it with the Medicaid expansion folded in-an action unquestionably within the limits of the Spending Clause." Three Justices dismissed this argument out of hand, pointing to the doubtful political viability of repealing and reenacting Medicaid.8 But even if the objection is sound, the Court should not remain oblivious to the problem of the "politically improbable" least restrictive means. Pre-RFRA free exercise law avoided the difficulty by not invoking a less restrictive means that would have demanded new legislative action to avoid third-party burdens. A per se rule against such a demand would avoid the problem without requiring courts to make these difficult political judgments.
V. "STATUTORY INTERPRETATION" AS A RATIONALIZATION FOR OLIGARCHY
Perhaps it is because Hobby Lobby is a statutory interpretation case that in it the Court abandons the judicial restraint that guided its constitutional interpretation in Smith. The situation created by the Court's creative and surprising reinterpretation of RFRA invites comparison with the Court's deployment of the category of "traditional governmental functions." The Court experimented with that category as the basis for a constitutional rule restraining the imposition of federal law on the states: these functions were immune from federal regulations such as the minimum wage.
9 0 The rule eventually was abandoned as "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice," because the rule invited the judiciary "to make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes." 9 1 But it later revived it as a presumption of statutory interpretation: federal statutes will not be construed to alter the "usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government" unless Congress's intention is "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."92 This presumption has then been applied retroactively to statutes which were enacted before the Court announced it.
The rule of Gregory is one of a number of techniques of statutory distortion that the Court has deployed in recent years. These include wrenching terms out of context in order to contradict the statute's purpose, relying on presumptions that are so strong that they defeat express statutory language, aggressive use of preemption doctrine to defeat state regulatory laws that Congress had no intention of disturbing, devising new interpretive approaches and applying them retroactively to laws already in existence, and minimizing the effect of corrective legislation that overrides the Court's misinterpretations.9 Hobby Lobby is best understood as standing in this In interpreting statutes, Scalia rejects the use of legislative history because it is manipulable -like "entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one's friends."
9 5 There will always be so many bits of legislative history that one can cherrypick the results that one likes, and individual legislators can insert statements into the record declaring intentions that were never agreed to by Congress as a whole or the President. This objection imagines a particularly gullible use of legislative history, in which such statements are given the same weight as a conference committee report. The solution is a mighty broad one: excluding all information about the legislative history.
If -it is a big if -the purpose of the new textualism is to limit judicial discretion, then it is a failure. In practice, when freed from the need to pay any attention to what Congress was actually trying to do, the Court has been empowered to manipulate a law's language to reach politically congenial results. The fewer the sources of law, the more ambiguity and therefore the more discretion. It is like keeping a bouncer outside the cocktail party to keep out anybody one prefers not to chat with.
Legislative history in practice constrains judges. A survey of more than thirty years of Supreme Court labor law opinions found that when legislative history was relied upon, judges were more likely to vote against their ideological preferences -with Democrat-appointed judges voting in favor of employer interests, and Republican-appointed judges voting in favor of worker interests. Since Scalia joined the Court, the diminishing reliance on legislative history has been accompanied by increasingly proemployer results. doesn't even make sense at the level of textualism. As noted earlier, legislative findings in the text of RFRA make clear that its purpose is to restore the pre-Smith balancing test. But Hobby Lobby is radically at odds with this statutory statement of purpose. It reaches a result that would have astonished Congress.
If legislative history is in fact a constraint upon judges, then the campaign to ignore legislative history can be understood as a prescription for liberating judges from it. The removal of this source of law introduces ambiguity into areas of law where there otherwise would be none. Judges are then free to resolve such ambiguities in politically congenial ways. They are more likely to defy Congress's obvious intentions when they have reason to be confident that Congress will not be able to intervene.
97 And they accomplish this by a technique that is paraded as evidence of their superior virtue and restraint.
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CONCLUSION
If government refusals to accommodate are viewed with the kind of skepticism that the Court displays in Hobby Lobby, then claims of accommodation will nearly always be supported by some imaginable less restrictive means, even if its enactment is politically impossible. The consequence in practice will be an interpretation of religious liberty in which adherents get to harm nonadherents, in which some are force to pay for the religious exercise of others. Religious liberty here would mean the right to impose your religion on other people who don't share your views.
This activism sits uneasily beside the conspicuous judicial restraint of Smith. The Court can, and sometimes does, say that its interpretation of a statute is vindicated by the fact that Congress has let its decision stand. But changing statutory law isn't easy. The Court craves democratic legitimation, but evidently bogus legitimation will do.
One of the principal attractions of the idea of religious liberty has always been that the exercise of one person's religion doesn't hurt anyone else. In Thomas Jefferson's classic formulation: "it does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty gods, or no god. covered by insurance is exactly like having one's pocket picked, while involuntary pregnancy is worse than a broken leg.
The Court evidently thinks that it is helping the cause of religious liberty by construing RFRA very broadly. It may have lost sight of the fact that RFRA is a statutory accommodation, and Hobby Lobby is a mere statutory interpretation that Congress has the power to undo. The existence and vitality of RFRA-and other statutory accommodations of religionultimately depends on the sufferance of Congress and the voters who elect it. How likely is it that those voters will support religious claims that manifestly hurt innocent people, or pay in perpetuity to subsidize religious practices they do not share and may find politically or morally repugnant? Religion has been a great force for good in the world,"oo but it is hard to see that when this is its most prominent manifestation. If this is the official meaning of religious liberty, than the broad acceptance of religious liberty will fade.
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